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FOREWORD
Water supply, allocation, use and conservation are constantly debated
in California, often appearing as highly charged political issues in
candidates' races and on election ballots.

This year is no exception,

with major ballot propositions already scheduled for the June primary
election and being circulated to qualify for the November general
election.
Accordingly this Research Paper on legal aspects of water allocation
is being published for the valuable background it affords readers wishing
to learn more about the subject.

The author draws on his legal expertise,

as well as his experience as Staff Director of the Governor's Commission
to Review California Water Rights Law.

The paper emphasizes the crucial

role of water rights in California water management, and it points to the
need for and present lack of a political consensus on water law reform.
The author concludes by suggesting forces that could bring about
interest-group realignments and other developments favorable to achieving
the needed consensus on water law and management reform that so far has
eluded Californians.

Stanley Scott
Assistant Director
Institute of Governmental Studies
March 1982
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Introduction
Four aspects of the allocation of water in California are of paramount
importance.

First, several different types of water rights are

recognized, some radically different from the others.

Second, two public

interest limitations on water rights exist, although generally poorly
developed.

Third, in some parts of the state the construction of massive

water development projects and the creation of elaborate contractual
arrangements have largely eclipsed the classical water rights.

And

fourth, the law has not been adequately developed in regard to groundwater
management, the preservation of instream flows and water conservation.
This paper deals with each of these four matters in turn, then concludes
with an analy.sis of political aspects of water law reform.
Water Rights Recognized in California
Appropriative Water Rights
When gold rush fever brought thousands of prospectors to California's
foothills in the late 1840s, there were several ways in which the water
crucial for mining operations might have been allocated.

Spanish and

Mexican law had, of course, played an important role in earlier years in
California, and the miners might have turned to those sources for their
water law principles.

The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected land

titles granted under previous regimes, and in fact the pueblo water right
of municipalities was later recognized by California courts.

But the

coastal municipalities accepted as having pueblo water rights were far
from the scene when the miners were exploring for gold in the foothills of
the Sierra Nevada and the Trinity Alps, and resort was not made to the
Spanish and Mexican sources.
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Another possibility was the Anglo-American common law, which was well
established in the eastern states from which many of the gold miners came.
Common-law principles provided that water rights grew out of land
rights--that the use of water was given to those who owned the land along
the stream.

The miners, however, were trespassers, prospecting and

working lands which technically belonged to the

u.s.

government.

Whether

for that reason or perhaps because they were unfamiliar with the
common-law rules, the Anglo-American approach was not utilized.
Instead the gold miners in California treated their water as they
treated their gold:

"first in time, first in right."

Just as the first

person to establish physical control over a mining site was treated in
practice as having the best claim, the first to divert water from a stream
to use it in washing the ore was treated as preferred.

This principle,

known later as the system of "prior appropriation," was quickly accepted
by the California courts and later was copied throughout the Western
United States.

In the leading case of Irwin v. Phillips, the Supreme

Court of California noted that the principle of prior appropriation was
fixed by "a universal sense of necessity and propriety." 1

One may

speculate that the court, part of a state government with at best a
tenuous hold over the population at that time, believed it could enforce
no other choice.
The appropriative water right which was thus recognized at an early
date in California has several important characteristics.

Most

importantly, it assumes that water is an independentnaturalresGurce to
be allocated separately from land.

In the prior appropriation system land

ownership rights do not confer water rights, nor is land ownership
technically a prerequisite to the perfection of an appropriative water
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right.
A significant consequence of this notion is that water once
appropriated may be used where needed.

It need not be used on the land

along a stream, technically known as "riparian" (from the Latin word for
bank), nor need it be used within the watershed.

Gold miners often sent

appropriated water many miles to the place of need, and later on the
coastal cities developed water projects for diverting appropriated waters
from the mountains to the edge of the Pacific Ocean.

The most recent

major water projects in California take water from north to south rather
than from east to west, again on the basis of a right of prior
appropriation.
Beneficial Use.--Beneficial use rather than land ownership came to be
the central requirement for the appropriative water right.

For land in

the United States, it had been rare to require an owner to put the land to
beneficial use in order to establish or maintain ownership.

But for water

under the appropriative rights system which has been dominant in the
Western United States, the property rights rules require that the water
diverted be put to beneficial use.
In the early days this requirement may have functioned as a surrogate
for notice to others that certain quantities of the flow of a stream had
been claimed.

Notice was itself required, often no more formal than a

notification nailed to a tree near the point of diversion, but the
beneficial use requirement ordinarily meant that diversion works were
needed, which provided notice even more clearly.
Because an appropriative water right extends only to so much water as
has been put to beneficial use, the right is quantified.

That is, each

appropriator is entitled to the amount diverted and put to beneficial use
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as of a specific moment in time.

If subsequently a larger amount is

diverted by a particular appropriator, the excess could be claimed only on
the basis of a subsequent appropriation with a later and more junior
priority date.

Conversely, if in subsequent use a particular appropriator

diverts less than had previously been diverted and continues the lesser
diversions for the period required by the law, the appropriative water
right is reduced to the amount actually diverted and put to beneficial
use.

It can readily be seen that the latter principle, desirable perhaps

as protection against the speculative holding of water rights, is a major
disincentive to water conservation measures that could reduce the amount
needed, say, to irrigate a particular parcel of land.

For this reason the

California Water Code recently was amended to provide that reduction in
the use of appropriated water because of water conservation efforts is
"deemed equivalent" to a reasonable beneficial use of the water.2
This description of the quantified nature of appropriative water
rights may give an impression of certainty which is often unwarranted.

At

least for the early appropriative water rights not subject to permit
control by the state, there is considerable uncertainty.

For one thing,

although it may be relatively easy to establish the actual capacity of
diversion works, there may be considerable doubt as to how much water in
earlier years was actually diverted and put to beneficial use through
particular works.

Furthermore, particularly with regard to cities, the

courts have been indulgent in allowing capacity to be expanded in later
years pursuant to the presumed original intent of the city to serve its
residents.

Such uncertainties have been largely eliminated for surface

rights acquired by appropriation since 1914, for these require the filing
of an application with the state and the granting of a permit which
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specifies the amount of water covered by the right.

It remains true even

for these rights, however, that the water right is good only for the
amount actually put to beneficial use, which may be less than is shown on
the face of the permit.
The Diversion Controversy.--In recent years an important controversy
has raged regarding appropriative water rights as to the necessity for
"diversion", i.e., some form of physical control of the water.

It is

clear that in the past most appropriators have diverted the water, either
by sending it away from the streambed through a canal or by controlling it
at the site by means of a dam.

The California statutes, however, do not

explicitly require such physical control nor has the California Supreme
Court ever explicitly laid down such a requirement. ·
In two recent test cases, organizations interested in fisheries have
sought so-called "instream appropriations" in order to insure minimum
flows in particular streams.

In the first case, California Trout, a

private organization, applied to the state to appropriate three cubic feet
per second of water from Redwood Creek in Marin County.

No dam, ditch or

other water diversion structure was planned, and California Trout made it
clear it simply wished the water to be left in the stream for fishery
purposes.

Subsequently the State Department of Fish and Game filed a

similar application for the appropriation of water from the Mattole River
in Humboldt County.

In both cases the State Water Resources Control

Board, the administrative entity charged with the responsibility for
receiving and processing applications to appropriate surface waters,
returned the applications without processing them.

The board took the

position that California law requires "control akin to possession" in
order to have an appropriative water right.
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Neither case went to the

California Supreme Court, but in both cases the Court of Appeal agreed
with the State Water Resources Control Board.3

The decisions noted

certain statutes which imply, they said, that physical control akin to
possession is required, and one decision emphasized provisions of the
water code which reflect legislative solicitude for the protection of
instream values by means other than an appropriation.4
In the contemporary administration of California's prior appropriation

system of water rights, a crucial question is whether unappropriated water
is available for appropriation.

The water, of course, must be in a

watercourse, that is, a stream flowing in a bed with banks.

Thus one

cannot appropriate water flowing in a diffused fashion over the surface of
the earth.

Such water is not in a watercourse, and it belongs to the

owner of the land upon which it is found.
Unappropriated water in a watercourse and available for appropriation
must not be subject to vested rights, whether appropriative or otherwise,
nor must it be needed in the watercourse for the protection of beneficial
uses such as fisheries.S

Since for any particular watercourse, it is rare

to have a complete and precise list of all "vested" water rights, there
often is considerable doubt as to whether there is unappropriated water
available for appropriation.

The question is settled initially in

administrative proceedings in which eKpertise in water resources
engineering plays an important role.

Often the answer is that water is

available for appropriation in some seasons of the year but not in others.
Since by definition an appropriator of water acquires a priority date
junior to all previously existing water rights, it may legitimately be
asked how much difference it makes whether water is available for
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appropriation.

It might be argued that the appropriator takes his or her

chances, and if no water subsequently is available for appropriation, it
is that person's loss.

However, the granting of an appropriative right

may well create expectations in the permittee that water will be available
at least at some point in time, and the existence of the "paper right" may
encourage the appropriator to take acts which could result in controversy
or litigation, either with those holding water rights or with those
charged with protecting beneficial instream uses.

In California, it

appears as a rule of thumb that appropriative water rights are issued only
if it may reasonably be expected that water will be available at least
half the time covered by the right.
The courts protect junior as well as senior appropriators.

Although

"first in time, first in right" means that junior appropriator B can do
nothing to interfere with senior appropriator A's diversion, B is entitled
to have the stream in the condition it was when he initiated his
appropriation, insofar as is necessary to protect his diversion.

Thus,

for example, B can object to A changing his point of diversion, say from a
point upstream of B to a point downstream from B, if the resulting change
in return flow to the stream works to B's disadvantage.

This would be the

case where B had appropriative rights to A's return flow.
This protection of junior appropriators contributes to rigidity in the
pattern of allocation of appropriative water rights.

The fact that many

such rights are held by water districts, which acquired them to provide
for water supply in the district's designated service area, contributes to
this rigidity.

Although in principle an appropriative water right is

freely transferable independent of land ownership, these constraints mean
transfers occur much less frequently than might be supposed.
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There are no precise statistics in California on the particular
quantities of water used on the basis of particular kinds of water rights.
It is clear, however, that the appropriative water right is far and away
the most important.

Of the roughly 200 million acre feet which the state

receives annually in precipitation, most is evaporated, evapotranspired by
native vegetation, or runs off to the ocean.

Approximately 37,000,000

acre feet is used for irrigation, municipal water supply, or otherwise,
but since there is a certain amount of reuse of water the average annual
net water demand is about 31,000,000 acre feet.

Of this amount, it

appears that about half is used on the basis of an appropriative right to
surface water.

In addition considerable quantities of groundwater are

used on the basis of an appropriative right, as will be discussed further
below.
Riparian Water Rights
Although the riparian water right of the Anglo-American common law was
dominant in the 19th Century and remains so today throughout the eastern
and midwestern United States, many western states have not recognized
riparian rights at all.

These states, known generally as the "Colorado

Doctrine" states, repudiated the riparian water right on the ground that
it is by nature unsuitable for semi-arid conditions,6 since in principle
it is thought to provide little security of investment.
California, however, followed another course.

The leading case of

Irwin v. Phillips applied appropriative principles rather than riparian
principles, not on the ground the former were intrinsically better suited
to local conditions, but rather on the ground neither litigant there had a
proprietary interest which could serve as the foundation for the riparian
right.

For decades after Irwin v. Phillips was decided, there were doubts
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as to whether California recognized riparian water rights or not, and the
debate took on political as well as legal importance.7
The issue was finally settled in 1886 in the monumental case of Lux v.
Haggin.

This was truly a battle of the giants.

Lux was Charles Lux of

the Miller and Lux Company, which owned tremendous quantities of land
throughout the San Joaquin Valley, particularly along the Kern River and
the San Joaquin River.

These were ranching lands, and the Miller and Lux

Company relied on spring flood flows to irrigate these lands and to
deposit silt upon them.

As landowners, they claimed a riparian right to

have these flows uninterrupted by those above them.

Haggin was one of the

founding partners of the Kern River Land and Cattle Company, later to
become the Kern County Land Company, a powerful force in the southern part
of the San Joaquin Valley.

Haggin and his partners intended to divert

large quantities of water upstream from Miller and Lux to use for
irrigation.
The case was in the courts for nine years, which in that epoch was
considered a long time for litigation, and resulted in a four-to-three
decision of the California Supreme Court which covers nearly 200 pages in
the official reports.

Although many legal arguments were made and the

decision amounts to a mini-treatise on California water rights law in the
19th Century, the gist of the decision was that in 1850 California had
adopted the common law as the law of the state and the common law gives to
the riparian a right to use water in the contiguous water course.

Nothing

in Irwin v. Phillips changed that principle, since both parties there were
technically trespassers and consequently the riparian right was
irrelevant.

The court noted that the common-law riparian right not only

exists in California but is superior to appropriative rights, except in
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the rare case when the appropriative right has vested before a patent to
the riparian land was issued by the government.8
The riparian water right, like the appropriative water right, is a
right simply to use water--it is "usufructuary."

All water remains "the

property of the people,"9 although it is a subject of debate whether any
consequences flow from that residual public ownership.
Aside from being usufructuary, the riparian right is entirely
different from the appropriative right.

It depends on land ownership.

It

does not require use--in principle an unexercised riparian right has the
same status as an exercised riparian right, although the California
legislature has placed some limitation upon that principle.lO

When

exercised, the riparian water right is limited to use on a riparian parcel
within the watershed.ll

Apparently the latter limitation is based on the

idea that land and water go together, and that water used within the
watershed will, at least in part, be returned to the stream from which it
was diverted.
A "Reasonable" Share.--According to the California approach to
riparian water rights, each riparian is entitled to a "reasonable" share
of the natural flow of the stream.12

There is a right to storage,l3 but

water may not be stored for longer than a temporary period.l4
A variety of factors are considered in deciding what constitutes a
reasonable share.

The Restatement of Torts suggests nine such factors:

the purpose of the use; the suitability of the use to the watercourse; the
economic value of theuse;thesocial value of the use (with domestic use
given preference); the extent and amount of harm caused to another; the
practicality of adjusting the use to avoid that harm; the practicality of
adjusting the quantity of water used by each claimant; the burden of
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requiring the user causing the harm to bear the loss; and protection of
existing values of land, investments and enterprises.15

The final factor

mentioned by the restatement represents a deviation from the commonly
stated idea that riparians among themselves stand on an equal footing,
whether or not they have made use of their riparian right, and it may be
questioned whether this factor will be accepted by the courts in
California.
The states in the west which like California have recognized riparian
as well as appropriative rights have been known as "California doctrine"
states.

With the exception of California, however, all have in one way or

another very significantly limited the riparian right.

California

attempted to join in this pattern through provisions in the Water
Commission Act of 1913 which would have limited the riparian right, for
example by providing the riparian right is lost if not put to use within
ten years of the statute.

These limitations, however, were declared

unconstitutional when challenged in court,l6 so that the riparian right in
California today retains nearly the importance which it had in 1886.
Given changes in the other states, one noted authority has suggested that
it would be more appropriate now to refer to the "California rule" rather
than the "California doctrine."17
Although the legal status of the riparian may be unchanged in
California, there have been developments which as a practical matter have
provided greater certainty as to who the riparians are and how much water
they are entitled to claim.

As major water development projects have been

planned and constructed, such as the federal government's Central Valley
Project, negotiations have taken place between the project managers and
riparians, and in many cases agreements and exchanges have been worked
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out.

Thus, for example, riparians on the San Joaquin River have exchanged

their water rights to natural flow for entitlements to project waters
released from Friant Dam.
A similar process has occurred on the Sacramento River as a result of
the construction of Shasta Dam.

It appears today that the major users of

water who claim it on the basis of riparian rights are found in the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, where the issue is water quality rather than
water quantity.

A reasonable speculation as to the amount of riparian

usage statewide would appear to be ten percent of the 31,000,000 million
acre feet of average annual net water demand.
Groundwater Rights
According to the common law, groundwater was allocated by a so-called
rule of "absolute ownership"--whoever owned the land above the groundwater
reservoir was entitled to whatever groundwater he or she could pump.l8

In

fact, however, this was a rule of capture, for there was no protection
against a neighbor's pumping and drawing away one's groundwater.

In any

event California early abandoned this approach, and in the well-known case
of Katz v. Walkinshaw in 1903 laid down a series of rules that are
sometimes referred to as the "doctrine of correlative rights."19

The

court there provided that the paramount right goes to an overlying owner
engaged in an overlying use.

Such a use must be on the land overlying the

groundwater basin in question, and another early case indicates that the
land must be owned by the pumper.20

Thus, technically, a city pumping

groundwater to irrigate its municipal golf course is exercising an
overlying right, whereas a city pumping water from the same basin and
delivering it to residents who own their own parcels is not.

In case of

dispute among the overlyers, the riparian principle is followed:
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each is

entitled to a reasonable share.

Furthermore, like riparians, overlyers

have rights whether these are exercised or not.
Katz v. Walkinshaw also provided that to the extent there is water
surplus to the reasonable needs of overlying users, such water is
available for appropriation.

Among appropriators, the "first in time,

first in right" principle of allocation applies.

Thus the basic court

regime developed at the beginning of this century for groundwater closely
parallels the California surface water regime.
It is questionable how practical these rules for groundwater
allocation are.

Most of the major adjudications of groundwater basins

which have occurred in California have utilized a different principle,
that of "mutual prescription," which will be discussed below in the
section on prescriptive water rights.

Since a recent decision of the

California Supreme Court raises serious questions as to whether the
doctrine of mutual prescription will again be imposed in a groundwater
adjudication,21 the solutions of Katz v. Walkinshaw are relevant, but seem
to present serious difficulties, at least for complex basins.

Where a

city pumps water, for example, it may be very difficult to sort out
overlying uses from appropriative uses or to determine the correct
priority date for the latter.

In many cases of surface water utilization,

the capacity for diversion was fixed early in time and the use pattern has
remained relatively constant.

For groundwater, however, with pumps being

added from time to time and the amounts being pumped highly variable and
dependant on the availability of surface water, there are problems.
Because groundwater basins typically underly a large number of surface
parcels, the owners of these parcels are linked in an important way with
regard to their use of ground water.
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When one of them pumps from the

aquifer, all are to some extent affected.

Those among the surface owners

who pump will receive all the benefit of the use of water, but those who
do not pump, as well as those who do pump, will be subject to any ensuing
detriments, such as subsidence of the surface, intrusion of sea water as
the water table drops or increased energy costs for a longer pumping lift.

.

This imbalance of benefits and burdens provides a strong incentive to each
overlying user--and, to the extent there is a surplus, to any potential
appropriator--to exploit the resource.

Natural resource economists have

frequently emphasized that in such a "common pool" situation, there is
every likelihood that the resource in question will be overexploited.
Approaches to Groundwater Management.--Given this characteristic of
the groundwater resource, some form of collective or public decision
making is important.

In California, two approaches have been utilized.

In a few areas water districts have been established and given powers to
enable them to manage the basin for the common good.

Two areas which have

achieved excellent results through the water district mechanism are Orange
County and the Santa Clara Valley.22
A second approach has been adjudication.

In Southern California more

than half a dozen water basins have been adjudicated and presently are
managed by water masters acting under the jurisdiction of the court.23

As

is the case with water districts, this allows a lid to be placed on
aggregate pumping from the basin in particular years in order to avoid
harmful impacts on all users.
Cooperation among interested parties is also necessary i f the aquifer
is to be managed as if it were a subsurface reservoir.

In recent years

water resources engineers have been more and more interested in such
management, which generally is known as "conjunctive use."
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Conjunctive

use means that the surface reservoirs constructed by man are operated in
tandem with the natural underground reservoirs, so that in dry years more
is taken from the subsurface sources and in wet years more is taken from
the surface sources.

To many, conjunctive use principles suggest also

that ground water basins at capacity should be to some extent pumped down
in order to create storage space for the surplus waters available in wet
years.
Fortunately, recent case law in California has greatly strengthened
the legal basis for conjunctive use management.
particular mention.

Two cases deserve

In the Niles case, the Court of Appeal declared that

land owners are subject to a "public servitude" regarding the water stored
in aquifers beneath their land.24

In that case a water district had a

groundwater replenishment program which was designed to conserve local
runoff, regulate imported water supplies, and prevent salt water
intrusion.

Water put underground by the water district was, however,

flooding the gravel pits being operated by a private company, and as a
consequence the company was pumping water out of those pits into the San
Francisco Bay.

In other words, the water district and the private company

were working at direct cross purposes, the one putting in water which the
other then pumped out without putting it to any beneficial use.

When the

controversy came to the courts, it was decided that the pumping was not
reasonable insofar as it interfered with a public servitude which entitled
the water district to replenish the basin up to the point representing
"the state of nature."
The second important case involved a controversy as to water which
reached groundwater basins in the San Fernando Valley after being brought
to Southern California from the Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles.
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In some cases the City of Los Angeles had directly recharged the aquifers;
in others, the imported water had been delivered to customers in the San
Fernando Valley, and a portion of that water had subsequently found its
way into the groundwater basins.

In a case decided in 1975, the Supreme

Court of California affirmed the right of the importer to recapture water
which it had added to the groundwater supply of the basin.25

Since

importing and recapturing water in this fashion is an essential part of
conjunctive use management, the decision of the court in the San Fernando
Valley case has been widely hailed as a progressive one.
Prescriptive Water Rights
The appropriative and riparian water rights which have been described
are "rightful," in that an individual acted legitimately in putting water
to beneficial use or in acquiring a property interest in land sufficient
to support a riparian water right.

Water law, however, like land law

recognizes that in certain situations wrongful action by an individual may
also lead to creation of a water right.

Such water rights are

"prescriptive," and they may exist both for surface water and for
groundwater.

Open use adverse to the interest of the rightful user for at

least five years is required.
For surface waters, water held subject to an appropriative right is
subject to prescription if the right dates from before the institution of
state permit control in 1914.

For many years there was controversy as to

whether a prescriptive right could similarly be acquired as to water
subject to appropriation after the institution of tne state permit
system.26

Nothing in the statutory provisions on appropriation speaks

directly to the question, but it was argued by many that the statutory
appropriations system was intended to be the exclusive means for
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initiating a nonriparian water right, and that state supervision of this
process could not be wholly effective if an "end run" were permitted by
way of prescription.

In a recent decision the California Supreme Court by

a four-to-three vote agreed.27
Thus with regard to appropriative surface water rights the role of
prescription is quite limited.

It remains true, however, that riparian

rights are fully subject to prescription, although in order to act
wrongfully a prescripter ordinarily must interfere with a reasonable use.
It is not enough to divert flow which the riparian might claim but is not
in fact claiming, except in the special case where the prescripter uses
the water on non-riparian land.28
In California water rights law, prescription has enjoyed its greatest
significance with regard to groundwater.

In the first of a series of

important groundwater adjudications in Southern California, the California
Supreme Court in 1949 announced the doctrine of "mutual" prescription.29
That adjudication involved one unit of the Raymond Basin in the Pasadena
area, from which in most years more water was pumped out than went in.

In

other words, the safe yield was being exceeded, so that the basin was in a
state of permanent overdraft.
The most enduring part of the decision by the California Supreme Court
was that aggregate pumping from the basin would have to be limited to the
safe yield.
much?

The question then became:

who should be cut back and by how

The court might have employed the principles enunciated in Katz v.

Walkinshaw, according to which the most junior appropriators would
initially be cut off, then if necessary the senior appropriators in turn
would lose their pumping rights, and then the overlyers would be reduced
until eventually the point of equilibrium was reached.
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Apparently this

result seemed inequitable to the court, for important cities which enjoyed
merely the status of a junior appropriator would have been entirely cut
off.
Instead of following Katz v. Walkinshaw, the court seized on the
notion of prescription and declared that once overdraft had begun, each
pumper was acting to an extent prescriptively vis-a-vis the others.

Use

of prescription in such a case seems somewhat artificial, in that
prescription is rooted in hostile or adverse use, yet in the Pasadena
situation all pumpers were getting all the water they wanted.

The problem

was that the aggregate impact was adverse to proper long-term management
of the basin.

So far as the individual pumpers were concerned, the impact

was on the pumping lift, not on taking the water, yet it has never been
established in California that there is the right to maintenance of a
fixed pumping lift.
The doctrine of mutual prescription was used from 1949 to 1975 to
decide a series of groundwater adjudications, many of which were
terminated on the basis of a stipulated judgment.

In the San Fernando

decision in 1975, however, the court concluded that there can be no
prescription against public entities or public utilities engaged in
groundwater pumping.30

The court based itself on a provision of the civil

code enacted in 1935,31 but not considered in the Pasadena case since all
but one of the parties there had stipulated to the judgment and the
nonstipulating party was a public utility not then covered by the
statutory language.
It seems unlikely at the present time the doctrine of mutual
prescription will be imposed in order to provide equitable solutions to
groundwater controversies, since it seems most unbalanced to say that
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public pumpers can acquire prescriptively against private pumpers but not
the reverse.

It should also be noticed that the San Fernando decision

makes the doctrine of mutual prescription more difficult to apply in other
ways as well, since there was a tightening up on the notice requirement,
as well as a redefinition of when aggregate pumping exceeds the
permissible level.

The court at one point also refers to the doctrine of

"equitable apportionment," previously developed by the United States
Supreme Court in the context of interstate controversies, and seems to
suggest that the ultimate objective of any court adjudicating a
groundwater controversy ought to be an equitable apportionment.32
Statutorily Adjudicated Rights
Water rights disputes in California may be resolved by agreement among
the parties, by an ordinary civil action brought by a water rights
claimant or by a statutory adjudication.33

A statutory adjudication is an

administrative proceeding conducted by the State Water Resources Control
Board ending in a determination of all the rights to water in a particular
stream system.

This determination is filed with a court, which then

issues a decree defining each water right at to its owner, priority,
amount, season of use, purpose of use, point of diversion and place of
use.

The decree binds all claimants to water from the stream system in

question, regardless of whether a particular claimant took part in the
proceedings.

As thus stated, a statutory adjudication might appear to be simply a
procedure for settling water rightssuch as the appropriative, riparian
and other water rights discussed above.

Close examination of past

practice in statutory adjudications, however, combined with a recent
legislative change, suggest that in fact it is more accurate to regard the
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statutorily adjudicated water right as an entity different from the better
known "classical" water rights.
Statutory adjudications in California were first authorized by the
Water Commission Act of 1913.

That act was amended, however, in 1917 to

exclude riparian rights, so the procedure quickly lost its
comprehensiveness.

Furthermore, initially, it was little used -- between

passage of the statute and 1935, only five statutory adjudications were
undertaken. 34
In 1935, the legislation was amended again to include riparian rights,
so that once more a statutory adjudication could lead to a comprehensive
settlement of the surface water rights in a stream system.35

Since 1935

fifteen statutory adjudications have been completed, and currently another
six statutory adjudications are underway.

In each of these proceedings

the heart of the matter is determination of the validity of water rights
claims made and grouping of these rights into priority classes.
Adjudicating Claims.--Once the State Water Resources Control Board has
determined that it is in the public interest to grant a petition for a
statutory adjudication, the board makes a detailed investigation of the
stream system in question and calls for the filing of proofs of claim.
The investigation is conducted by water rights engineers from the board,
who examine all existing diversions and uses of water from the stream
system.

Often these engineers live for several months in the community

where the investigation is being conducted, and they develop considerable
acquaintance With both the stream and the various water rights Claimants.
Generally, the claimants themselves in filing their proofs of claim rely
entirely on the information developed during the board's investigation.
Once the proofs of claim have been received and a report prepared
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thereon, the board's engineers prepare a preliminary order of
determination designed eventually to become a court decree.

Although in

principle this preliminary order is based upon the water rights of the
various claimants, it is apparent that great weight is given to what
appear to be the equities of a given situation.

The work is done by the

engineers who did the field investigation, who only occasionally consult
with the board's lawyers at this stage in the proceeding.
Extensive recent interviews of board engineers and lawyers involved in
statutory adjudications together with a detailed review of the files of
all of these proceedings suggest that many factors play a part in
preparing preliminary orders of determination.36

The claimed water right

riparian, appropriative or prescriptive (or, often, "all of the above")
is the starting point, and, significantly, absent blatent error or a
challenge from another claimant, the claim is ordinarily accepted at face
value.

This means, for example, that generally board resources are not

devoted to tasks such as title searches to verify riparian claims and
investigations to determine the precise moment of initiation of a pre-1914
appropriative right.

Rather the emphasis is placed upon preservation and

legitimization of the status quo, with a strong presumption in practice
that someone who has used water for the past five to ten years has a valid
water right.

Heavy reliance is placed on a generalized notion of

prescription to justify this presumption.

Thus a non-riparian who

initiated a water use after 1914 without benefit of a permit will likely
be recognized as having a valid water right, the decision in People v.
Shirokow notwithstanding.37
Establishing Priority Classes.--Once a list of water rights has been
prepared, priority classes must be established.

-21-

Within each class users

are treated as having equal and correlative rights, although priority
dates of appropriative rights may later be resorted to if there is
insufficient water to satisfy all the users in a given priority class.
Invariably domestic use, whether active or dormant and regardless of the
basis of the water right, is placed in the first priority class, on the
theory this is required by Section 106 of the Water Code:

"It is hereby

declared to be the established policy of this State that the use of water
for domestic purposes is the highest use of water and that the next
highest use is for irrigation."

This means, for example, that a riparian

right for irrigation use is placed junior to a later-perfected
appropriative right for domestic use.

Curiously, the same logic

apparently is not followed to place all rights for water for irrigation in
a priority class higher than all other non-domestic uses.
Another important statutory provision used in preparing preliminary
orders of determination is Water Code § 100, which incorporates the
reasonable and beneficial use requirements of the state constitution.
This provision is offered as justification for the practice of placing
commercial stockwatering use above everything else except domestic use.
In establishing the priority class placement for rights other than
those used for domestic use or for commercial stockwatering use, reliance
in the past has been placed on a whole series of factors:

local

sentiment, the equities as seen by particular board engineers working on
the statutory adjudication, the desire to effect an optimal pattern of
water usage (often referred to as the need to find a "physical so1utionn),
current use, the availability of water, the suitability of unirrigated
riparian land for irrigation, prior judgments and agreements,
administrative precedents and ease of administration.
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Although many of

these same factors may in one way or another in fact affect determinations
made by a court, they seem to be taken into account more explicitly in a
statutory adjudication.

The practice seems to be in accord with the

"equitable apportionment" which the San Fernando court implied was the
proper goal of a water rights adjudication.38

It also seems to justify

the conclusion that in fact the "statutorily adjudicated" water right in
California is a kind of water right separate and distinct from the
riparian, appropriative or prescriptive water rights claimed by water
users at the inception of the proceeding.
Aside from the equitable origin of the statutorily adjudicated water
right, differences between the characteristics of this water right and
either of the principal classical water rights confirm the transformation
which takes place from filing of proof of claim to issuance of a
preliminary order of determination.

The statutorily adjudicated water

right is restricted to the place of actual use at the time of the
adjudication, a characteristic somewhat more restrictive than would be the
case for a common law riparian right (allowing use of water anywhere on a
riparian parcel within the watershed) and considerably more restrictive
than would be the case for a pre-1914 appropriative right (allowing use of
water anywhere, without regard to parcel lines or watershed boundaries).
It is similarly restricted as to purpose of use and point of diversion,
with changes in these allowed only by way of modification of the decree.
It is quantified, unlike the riparian right.

And, by virtue of recently

enacted Water Code Section 17 45, if awarded after January 1, 1981, it is
freely transferable, even if riparian in origin.
Other Water Rights
The pueblo right, as noted at the beginning of this chapter,
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originated in the Spanish and Mexican law.

It is the paramount right of

the city as successor to a pueblo to use water naturally occurring within
the pueblo limits for the city's inhabitants.

Only two cities in

California, San Diego and Los Angeles, have been recognized by the courts
as benefitting from pueblo rights,39 although several other coastal cities
may also qualify as successors to pueblos.

In the case of Los Angeles,

controversies over the city's pueblo right extended nearly a century.
From the 1880s on, lawsuits questioned the existence and meaning of this
right.40

In the most recent lawsuit, considerable effort was made to show

that earlier decisions in favor of Los Angeles had rested on faulty
historical evidence.

The Supreme Court of California, however, decided

the case in favor of the City of Los Angeles, and the court rested its
decision heavily upon the fact that Los Angeles had legitimately relied
upon earlier decisions, whatever their correctness as to the historical
evidence.
Another water right of benefit to governments was once thought of
exclusively as an Indian water right.

In 1908 the United States Supreme

Court enunciated the "Winters Doctrine," to the effect that when the
United States Congress set aside land in semi-arid portions of the west
for the settlement of Indians, it must impliedly have set aside sufficient
water for their needs.41

For many years it was widely assumed that this

sort of "reading between the lines" to find presumed Congressional intent
would be done only where the land was reserved for Indian use, but the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in 1963 i.n Arizona v. California made it
clear that reserved rights may exist as a matter of federal law for other
sorts of reservations as well.42

Examples would be wildlife refuges,

national parks, and national forests.
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In a recent case the U.S. Supreme

Court narrowed the potential for the reserved rights doctrine somewhat by
distinguishing between primary and secondary uses of federal reserved
lands and stating that implied water rights are reserved only to service
the primary uses.43

Nonetheless the doctrine remains an important one,

and the unquantified and often very uncertain nature of the reserved right
has periodically concerned state water officials who believe utilization
of water pursuant to such rights may disrupt the established use regimes.
Another right benefitting governments is the so-called "navigation
servitude," which exists under both federal and California law.

In its

federal incarnation, the navigation servitude is based upon regulatory
power vested in the Congress by the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.

Under this clause the federal government is permitted to

regulate commerce among the states or between the states and foreign
nations.

Many years ago the

u.s.

Supreme Court determined that when such

commerce clause power is being exercised by the federal government, no
compensation is owed for injury to private rights, so long as land above
the high-water mark is not adversely affected.44

Thus, for example, the

federal government may raise the water level in a navigable stream through
construction of a dam and need not pay for injury to a hydro-electric
power facility caused by decrease in the "head," that is, the drop from
water stored behind the dam to the water below.45
The California "navigation servitude" of course does not originate in
the Commerce Clause.

It is a creature of state law, and it seems to

express t:he fundamental proposition that private rights in land or water
may not be exercised so as to interfere with the public interest in
navigating upon, fishing in or otherwise taking general advantage of the
navigable waters of the state.46

Thus, for example, landowners may not
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interfere with the public use of navigable streams for the purpose of
floating pleasure craft along them.47

In a case involving the closely

related "public trust" doctrine, which in California seems to be identical
to the state navigation servitude, the California Supreme Court noted
several public purposes to be served in addition to fishing and navigable
commerce:

ecological study, open space and aesthetics were mentioned.48

The meaning of the public trust doctrine for California water rights
is now being tested in litigation involving Mono Lake.

There, pursuant to

licenses granted by the State Water Resources Control Board, the City of
Los Angeles is diverting most of the water which ordinarily would flow
into Mono Lake, and as a consequence the level of the lake has dropped
drastically in recent years.

The lower lake level in turn has detrimental

consequences for recreational uses of the lake, for gulls who use an
island in the lake for nesting purposes, and for other public interests.
The Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth and others are challenging the
diversions by the City of Los Angeles, in part on the ground they are in
violation of the public trust doctrine.49
Water-Rights Limitations Recognized in California
Reasonable and Beneficial Use
California's most important limitation on a water right is found in a
constitutional amendment which grew out of the continuing tension between
appropriative and riparian rights.

Lux v. Haggin, discussed above,SO

established that riparian rights are recognized in California and that in
most cases they are paramount to appropriative rights.

By definition, the

"reasonable share" concept of riparian law means riparians are limited by
a standard of reasonableness among themselves.
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Appropriators, on the

other hand, are entitled to a quantified amount of water in accordance
with their respective priorities.

But in disputes between a riparian and

an appropriator, the courts early in this century determined that the
riparian was limited neither by a standard of reasonableness nor to a
quantified amount.
This conclusion caused considerable difficulty for appropriators, and
in some instances appeared to permit the waste of water in a most dramatic
fashion.

The most notable case was the Herminghaus decision in 1926.51

Herminghaus, a Miller and Lux lessee on the San Joaquin River operating
some of the same grazing lands at issue in Lux v. Haggin, claimed that as
a riparian he was entitled to the full spring flood flow of the river in
order to boost the water to the point where it became useful to him, even
though less than one percent of the quantity was actually used for
irrigation purposes.

In litigation with those who wished to appropriate

water upstream and to store that spring runoff for their own purposes, the
Supreme Court of California decided for Herminghaus.
r~fusing

In addition to

to impose any reasonableness standard on a riparian vis-a-vis an

appropriator, the court declared that earlier legislation imposing a
two-and-a-half acre foot per acre maximum on the use of water for
irrigating uncultivated land was unconstitutional as beyond the police
power of the state.
This extreme decision, curious even when evaluated in light of the
constitutional standards prevailing at that time, led directly to
amendment of the state constitution.

Language was added which was

intended to extend a reasonableness standard to the Herminghaus situation,
but the provision is written broadly as a general prohibition of waste.
The most pertinent language is as follows:
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The right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or water
course in this state is and shall be limited to
such water as shall be reasonably required for the
beneficial use to be served and such right does
not and shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method
of diversion of water. California Constitution
Article 14, § 3, adopted November 6, 1928.
Renumbered Article 10, § 2, June 8, 1976.
Although the constitutional amendment clearly states what has become a
central tenet of Californi.a water rights law, that all use of water must
be reasonable and beneficial, there is little to guide one in knowing the
meaning of these vague terms.

The courts have been very lenient with

regard to determinations that a use is "beneficial."

Aside from the use

of water to kill gophers during the winter season,52 most uses have been
treated as beneficial.

The judiciary has been slightly more stringent

with regard to what is "reasonable," but in general has insisted that
reasonableness determinations must be made on a case by case basis and do
not respond to any general formulas.
A recent leading case on the meaning of reasonableness in the
constitutional sense is the Joslin case,53 where a riparian sand and
gravel company had relied on the flow of a stream to transport rock, sand
and gravel to its site.

When an upstream water district built a dam which

prevented the continued flow of the building materials, the company sued
for damages.

The company lost, for the California Supreme Court concluded

that its use of water was not reasonable vis-a-vis the competing use of
the water district.

The opinion seems impliedly to provide an analysis of

the comparative utility of the competing uses, although it is once again
stated that such determinations are made on a case by case basis.

The

court stated that broad public policy considerations played a major role
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in its decision.

It noted, for example, that "statewide considerations of

transcendent importance" suggest that water is in short supply whereas
building materials are not.54

Perhaps the best conclusion is that the

constitutional amendment stands today as something of a sleeping giant,
which may be awakened in future years as water grows shorter in supply and
the interest in water conservation increases.
The Permit and License System
Another means by which water rights are limited is the permit and
license system operated by the State of California for appropriation of
surface water from 1914 on.

Administrative control of such appropriations

was recommended by the Conservation Commission in its report of 1912,55
was initiated by the Water Commission Act of 1913 and was approved by the
people in a referendum held in 1914.56

Interestingly enough, the

Conservation Commission noted that there should also be a statutory system
for regulating percolating groundwater, but stated that it had not had the
time to study groundwater problems in sufficient detail to recommend a
statute.57
A major concern of the Conservation Commission was to make effective
the beneficial use limit which already existed for appropriative rights.
It was feared that large interests such as power companies would hoard
water and that in practice there was no way of enforcing beneficial use.
There was no central agency who knew who the appropriators were, what
their rights were or whether the rights were being properly exercised.
All this has changed since 1914 through the development of a certain
measure of administrative control.

The administrative function, now

performed by the State Water Resources Control Board, provides review of
applications to appropriate unappropriated water, including examination of
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the question whether the vested rights of others will be adversely
affected.

Permits are issued which allow the diversion of water, and upon

completion of the construction of water diversion projects a second step
occurs when a license is issued.

Generally conditions are placed in both

the permits and the licenses, some of them merely repetitions of statutory
and constitutional requirements, others tailor-made to fit a particular
situation.58

In any event, these provisions do limit the exercise of

water rights, and violation of one of the provisions could lead to
revocation of a right.
In general the administrative controls are tightest at the time when
the application is being processed.

Once the license has been issued,

there appears to be little review by the State Water Resources Control
Board, absent a complaint.
It should be noted that any limitations found in permits are much less
easy to enforce if the permit is held by a federal agency.

The key test

case in recent years has been State of California v. United States,
involving the New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River.

In this case the

authority of the State of California to impose terms and conditions on the
permits issued to a federal agency for operation of the dam was
challenged.

There is no question but that the federal government has the

constitutional right to ignore any terms and conditions imposed by a
state, but in Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 Congress directed
that state law be observed in certain respects in reclamation projects.
In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court, in what appears to
be a modification of its views on the meaning of Section 8, stated that
California may impose terms and conditions to the extent they are not
inconsistent with a clear Congressional directive.59

-30-

Thus terms and

conditions may be imposed on federal permittees, but for each one the
question may be asked whether or not the provision conflicts with a clear
Congressional directive.60
Partial Eclipse of Classical Water Rights in California
Thus far the various water rights historically recognized in
California have been discussed, as well as certain limitations on these
rights.

In certain parts of the state, however, these classical water

rights have been largely eclipsed by the use of other arrangements for the
allocation of water.

Typically this occurs where a large water

development project has been constructed, water in massive quantities
appropriated by the constructing agency, and arrangements of a consensual
nature made to distribute the water appropriated.
The first of these major projects was the Central Valley Project,61
initially planned by the State of California during the 1920s.

Inspired

by the success of the City of Los Angeles in moving large quantities of
water from the Owens Valley to the Southern California coastal plain, the
state developed plans to move large amounts of water from the high runoff
area of the Sacramento Valley to the lower runoff but more intensively
farmed area of the San Joaquin Valley.

Because of the Depression,

however, it proved impossible for the State of California to finance this
project, and it was turned over to the federal government.
The Central Valley Project was constructed by the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902, and it involves the
wholesaling of water by the Bureau to irrigation districts who retail the
water to the ultimate customers.

Although the Bureau of Reclamation holds

appropriative rights to allow its diversions, for example at Shasta Dam on
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the upper Sacramento River, its relationships with the water districts are
governed by contract.

Elaborate contracts, ordinarily for at least 40

years in duration, determine the price and availability of water.

They

also incorporate certain federal statutory requirements such as the excess
land limitation, which places a ceiling on land ownership by those
receiving water at heavily subsidized prices.

The districts themselves

are specialized forms of local government which have service obligations
to those within their boundaries.

These obligations are based not" on

contract, but rather on the status of the recipients.

A farmer receiving

water from a local irrigation district, which in turn has purchased the
water from the Bureau of Reclamation, is thus far from the position of the
classical appropriator or riparian user.
Similar arrangements exist for the State Water Project,62 planned
after World War II and still not completely constructed.

In this case the

appropriator is the California Department of Water Resources, which has
constructed facilities throughout the state, including those necessary to
pump water over the Tehachapi Mountains into Southern California.

The

Department of Water Resources distributes its water pursuant to contracts
entered into with various water agencies or water districts, which in turn
retail the water to ultimate consumers.
Significance of Water Rights for
Water Management in California
The existence of diverse types of water rights has not prevented
comprehensive water management in particular instances.

The Central

Valley Project, the State Water Project and the management programs
established for several important groundwater basins demonstrate that
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integrated management can be achieved in California, although it is
difficult to know how much less costly and more efficient the development
of these programs might have been if the water rights system had been
simpler.

These projects, of course, do not provide comprehensive water

management for California as a whole

indeed, often in recent years

there has been direct conflict between one program and another.
pol~tical

Given the

realities of a federal governmental system, of powerful water

agencies established at the local and regional levels, and of the
different values and objectives of the public and private entities holding
water rights, a single statewide water management program is out of the
question.
There are, however, three matters as to which progress may occur.
most importance is the question of groundwater management.

Of

When

California chose in 1913 not to include percolating groundwater in the
regulatory system established by the Water Commission Act, it departed
from the pattern followed in most western states.

Although groundwater

and surface water form part of a single hydrologic cycle, public interest
regulation was introduced for only one portion.

Consequently, surface

streams are to some extent protected against overdrafting, because
applications to appropriate unappropriated water may be denied where
necessary to protect beneficial instream uses, but protection against
overdrafting of groundwater basins is provided only sporadically through
the occasional water district management program or adjudication decree.
In a report submitted at the end of

1978~

the Governor's Commission to

Review California Water Rights Law drew attention to this problem and
recommended the adoption of a state policy aimed at the eventual
elimination of overdraft in most situations.63
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It was recommended further

that local governments be given the primary responsibility for achieving
this goal, with a review responsibility assigned to state government.64
The topic is politically volatile, particularly among farmers, many of
whom oppose any governmental interference with their present freedom in
most parts of California to pump unlimited quantities of groundwater.
Many farmers believe the appropriate response to continued overdrafting of
groundwater basins, which in some parts of the southern San Joaquin Valley
has become extremely serious, is to construct more dams on the northern
rivers, including those presently protected by the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act.

A New Groundwater Management Proposal
The "Water Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act," an initiative
measure which proponents are attempting to qualify for the November 1982
ballot, deals with the groundwater management issue more narrowly than did
the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law.

This

initiative measure, included in full for reference as Appendix A, adopts
as state policy the management of groundwater so as to avoid long-term
overdraft, land subsidence, water quality degradation and other
significant environmental harm.

It states that local economies shall be

built and sustained on reliable, long-term water supplies and not upon
long-term overdraft as a source of water supply.

But the operational

language to implement these goals is confined to the eleven groundwater
basins identified by the Department of Water Resources as currently
critically overdrafted.65

For these basins local entities are called upon

to establish a groundwater management authority, which in turn is mandated
to develop a groundwater management program to be approved by the State
Water Resources Control Board.

No provision is made for state management
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of the groundwater resources of these basins in the event local entities
fail to fulfill their responsibilities.

The initiative measure does

state, however, that, absent board approval of a groundwater management
program, one year after the effective date of the legislation no land
within the critical groundwater overdraft area in question shall be
irrigated if it lacks a recent irrigation history.

Thus where local areas

fail to deal effectively with groundwater overdraft by the assumption of
management responsibility as contemplated by the initiative measure, there
at least would be a prohibition against making matters worse by irrigating
land without a recent irrigation history.
Instream Flow Preservation
A second issue for the future is preservation of instream flows.

The

State Water Resources Control Board presently has considerable authority
to refuse or condition permits to appropriate surface waters in order to
protect instream flows for purposes such as recreation and fishing.66

It

may lack, however, the authority to develop any adequate comprehensive
regulatory scheme for a particular stream aimed at preservation of
instream flows,67 and it also apparently lacks the authority to grant
appropriative water rights for instream uses not involving control akin to
possession.68

The Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights

Law took the position that it would be inadvisable to grant the authority
to approve permanent instream water rights, because the interests being
protected are diffuse and essentially public in nature.69

The Commission

however recommended that authority to develop cQmprehensive instream flow
regulations be explicitly granted by the legislature to the State Water
Resources Control Board,70 although to date such a grant has not occurred.
On

the instream flow protection question, the Water Resources
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Conservation and Efficiency Act departs somewhat from the approach
supported by the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights
Law.

The act endorses the notion that the State Water Resources Control

Board should have clear authority to establish instream flow protection
standards.

But it also provides for the permanent appropriation of water

for instream uses without the necessity for physical control, provided
that the State Water Resources Control Board finds such appropriation to
be in the public interest and otherwise in accordance with existing law.
Furthermore, it requires that where conventional appropriations impact
adversely on fish and wildlife dependent on instream flows, conditions to
offset those impacts be imposed upon permittees.
Under the general heading of instream flow protection, the Water
Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act also includes measures on the
filling program for the reservoir created by New Melones Dam on the
Stanislaus River.

This dam, one of the most controversial ever to be

built in California, has been built and is operated by federal agencies,
so that any limitations imposed by state law must consider delicate
questions of state-federal relations.71

Insofar as the initiative measure

would limit the federal agencies, the provisions generally correspond to
those imposed by the State Water Resources Control Board.

The initiative

measure also, however, imposes limitations on entities contracting for
water from the New Melones Project, including subdivisions of the state
such as water districts.

These subdivisions -- arguably within the zone

of state activities ill1IIll.lfl.e fr01Il federal 1ntrusion72 ~- are prohibited from
entering into contracts for New Melones Project water unless (1) the
contracts are conditional upon 75% of the firm yield of the project being
contracted for and (2) the contracts use a pricing formula which would
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eliminate a large part of the massive subsidy characteristic of federal
water projects.
~-later

Conservation

The final topic which is bound to be of increased concern as the years
go by is water conservation.

It has been noted above that the

constitutional amendment of 1928 lays down a broad antiwaste standard,
with considerable potential for developmen~ by the courts.73

There are,

however, particular ways in which the water rights system works against
conservation, for example by requiring continued beneficial use for
maintenance of a water right.

Additionally some groups have suggested

recently that new water should not be available to importing areas until
they have demonstrated an adequate commitment to use of available water
conservation practices.

Again, however, the legislature has been

unreceptive to such urgings.74
The Water Conservation and Efficiency Act discussed above approaches
water conservation by imposing requirements only where there are
interbasin transfers of water of more than 20,000 acre-feet of water per
year.

Water suppliers or contractors engaged in such interbasin transfers

would be required by the initiative measure to prepare and submit to the
State Water Resources Control Board by January 1, 1985, a water
conservation program.

Furthermore, after the effective date of the

legislation no new or increased interbasin transfer would be permitted
until the board had determined that an adequate water conservation program
had been prepared and w.as being adequately implemented.
Toward a Political Consensus on Water Law Reform75
The experience of the Governor's Commission to Review California Water
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Rights Law, and that of a parallel effort in Arizona, illustrate both the
difficulty of creating a future that could command the support of
Californians and the ways in which those difficulties could be overcome.
Although some of the commission's minor recommendations have been enacted
into law,76 the commission's principal recommendations on groundwater
management and instream flow protection have never come close to
legislative approval.
No Consensus in California
Four general reasons eKplain the failure to achieve a political
consensus in favor of the commission's proposals.

First, the general

political climate is inhospitable to the kinds of changes proposed by the
commission.

At a time when the popular mood favors less government and

lower taxes, as represented in Washington by limited deregulation and in
California by Proposition 13, the commission recommended more government,
particularly in proposing groundwater regulation for those overdrafted
basins (notably in the southern part of the San Joaquin Valley) not now
subject to effective district control or to court decrees.

At a time when

the environmental movement has been put on the defensive, the commission
recommended more environmental protection, particularly in proposing
strengthened instream flow preservation.

And at a time with a crowded

political agenda and popular fatigue with many recurring issues, the
commission recommended changes which command little grassroots
understanding or committed support, but which generate intense opposition
from directly affected interest groups such as farmers.
Second, the commission's membership and mandate were organized in a
way that made political success very difficult.

Tne sponsor of the

commission, who chaired the State Water Resources Control Board, initially
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conceived of the commission as a nonpartisan, independent and expert group
which would make recommendations of a "technical" nature -- something like
those provided by the California Law Revision Commission.

Consequently,

no legislators were appointed to the commission, members were asked to
serve as individuals rather than as representatives of interest groups,
and lawyers with interested parties as clients were included only as a
result of outside pressure.

A distinguished and competent group of

commission members was ultimately assembled, but the assumption that the
key decisions could be treated as technical ones by impartial experts,
rather than as highly political ones requiring interest-group compromises,
proved untenable.

The decisions, such as whether to have increased

groundwater management and the respective roles of state and local
governments in such management, were political, but the political gears
had not been greased.

The commission itself lacked political power, the

various interest groups were not directly involved in the bargaining
process, and the commission had no powerful political patron.
gubernatorial in name only.

It was

Aside from one press conference given upon

receipt of the commission's final report, the governor did virtually
nothing to advance the commission's proposals.

And the commission lacked

effective political ties to the legislature, in marked contrast to the
situation a decade earlier when substantial revisions in California's
water quality law had been made.
Furthermore, the commission's mandate was probably stated too narrowly
to allow for

~lit:ieal

eonsensus.

Directed to study Cali.fornia water

rights law, staff and members of the commission believed it was beyond the
scope of their charge to examine either the law or current state policy
concerning water development projects.
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Yet, as noted above, many interest

groups believe more such projects are needed and regard any effort to
improve the management of existing water supplies as implicitly suggesting
that additional supplies should not be developed.

Thus, groups such as

the Association of California Water Agencies, the California Farm Bureau
Federation, and the California Chamber of Commerce, which favor further
water construction projects, took strong positions against the
recommendations for improved management.
In contrast, environmental groups such as the Planning and

Conservation League and public interest groups such as the League of Women
Voters generally supported the recommendations.

However, the commission

believed it lacked a mandate which would allow examination of a
comprehensive approach involving a mixture of management changes and
development projects.

Nor did the Brown Administration see fit to link in

any way the commission's management recommendations, which it nominally
supported, with the development proposals it supported with great vigor.
A third reason for the commission's lack of political success was its
inability to generate broad public support.

There was no crisis, such as

the Santa Barbara oil spill, which a decade earlier sparked federal
concern over oil pollution of water.

The drought, which had led to the

commission's creation, ended before doing serious harm to either the
economic well-being or the lifestyle of most Californians.

The commission

had among its members no well-known figure who could draw attention to its
work, as Pardee, the popular ex-governor, had done with respect to the
work of the Conservation Commission• 77

Other than the ·anadremous fishery

losses which are associated with water development projects, it was
difficult to build a dramatic and convincing factual case that businessas-usual would cause any significant harm to the general public.
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The

threat of federal action suggested by the early work of the Carter
Administration on a new national water policy soon lost credibility.

And

the commission itself was unable to achieve unanimity, which may qave had
an adverse political effect.
A final reason for the political defeat, at least initially, of the
commission's proposals was the misfortune of having its key proponents
within the executive and legislative branches either removed or seriously
weakened at critical junctures.

The chair of the State Water Resources

Control Board, who sponsored the commission - and was a highly articulate
spokesman for its views and the executive branch official most thoroughly
committed to pursuit of the recommended changes - was appointed to another
state position, out of the mainstream of water politics, just before the
commission's proposals came before the legislature.

And the speaker of

the assembly, who repeatedly had spoken publicly and forcefully in favor
of the commission's general approach to water policy, was embroiled in a
devastating leadership battle just as the commission's proposals were
being considered in committee.
Why Arizona Succeeded
The immediate failure of the Governor's Commission does not
necessarily mean that political consensus will never emerge; recent events
in Arizona attest to that.

This state radically revised its original law

in 1980, to provide for state management of groundwater aimed at limiting
pumping to "safe yield" in the three overdrawn areas projected to contain
major urban populations by the year 2025.78

Pump taxes, the permanent

retirement of irrigated land, prohibitions on the development of
subdivided land without a water supply assured for at least 100 years, and
mandatory conservation measures -- including continued reductions in per
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capita use -- are all provided for in new legislation which passed the
Arizona legislature by an overwhelming margin.79
The dramatic changes in Arizona are but the latest step in a
controversy over groundwater overdrafting in that state which goes back at
least to 1938.80

Several commissions have addressed the problem and, in

fact, reform legislation which eventually proved ineffective was passed in
1948.

But as recently as 1979, the commission then appointed to study the

problem seemed stalemated.

However, in a few short months political

consensus was achieved.
Several factors appear to have contributed to the ability of this
neighboring state to accomplish that which has proved so elusive in
California.

First, it was evidently clear to all that with construction

of the Central Arizona Project (CAP), no significant water development
projects remain to be built; there is no longer a realistic prospect of
water development projects in the Pacific Northwest for the benefit of the
lower Colorado basin.

Thus, interest groups such as mining firms and

cities were forced to look to reallocation of existing supplies to get
more water.

Second, a court decision in 1976 threw into question the

validity of even intrabasin transfers of water,81 much less interbasin
transfers.

Third, when the public process of debate within the special

blue-ribbon commission on groundwater appeared ineffective, a private
process of bargaining among representatives of three key interest groups
--mining, cities, and agriculture-- began.

Fourth, Arizona's governor

personally spent hundreds ofhours involved in these private·negotiations,

underscoring the enormous importance of a solution for the future of the
state.

Fifth, at crucial junctures the United States Secretary of the

Interior threatened dire consequences, such as a construction slowdown on
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the Central Arizona Project or allocations of CAP water in a way
unfavorable to non-Indian interests, if an adequate groundwater management
law was not forthcoming.

The governor was able to make effective use of

these threats, to force the negotiating interests to reach a compromise
solution.
It is impossible to know whether the Arizona groundwater management
statute will be held valid by the courts, will be preserved in its present
form by the legislature, or will prove to be effective in practice.

The

statute is now being tested in litigation challenging its
consititutionality,82 and recently the construction and financing
industries --not, it should be noted, groups which had participated in
the private negotiating process described above -- succeeded in having
some modifications in the legislation enacted.83

Nonetheless, the mere

fact that the Arizona groundwater management statute was adopted is
impressive proof that a political consensus among deeply antagonistic
forces can achieve major changes in the management of water.
Lessons for California
Despite obvious differences between the two states, several lessons
for California may be drawn from the Arizona experience.

First, consensus

for serious management reforms may be achievable only when further major
water development projects appear untenable to the water industry.

In the

context of California, this may occur only when the North Coast rivers
appear as beyond reach as did the Pacific Northwest rivers to Arizona -either because the costs of development make it unt.h.:i..nk.able or because
political limits appear effectively to have placed these rivers
indefinitely out of bounds.

Second, political consensus may be possible

only with some interest-group realignment, so that groups with
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long-standing stakes in the state's water resources decide to shift their
position to support management reform.

The most likely candidate for such

a decision appears to be urban interests.

If, for example, the

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California were greatly to
increase its emphasis on improved management and reallocation of developed
water supplies, which might permit a moderation of its development
policies, the political ramifications could be profound.

The Arizona

experience suggests that direct interest-group bargaining may be more
efficacious than the usual commission study/legislative debate route.
Finally, fortuitous factors, such as sustained federal pressure, or
inspired gubernatorial leadership, could play an important part in
bringing about significant water law reform based upon a durable political
consensus.

-44-

NOTES
1.

Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855).

2.

California Water Code Section 1011 (Deering Supp. 1981).

3.

Fullerton v. State \\fater Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d
590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979); California Trout, Inc. v. State
Water Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 672 (1979).

4.

Id. at 820-822 and 675.

5.

Cal. Water Code, Sections 1243 and 1243.5 (Deering 1977).

6.

Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company, 6 Colo. 443 (1882).

7.

State of California, The California Water Atlas 26 (1978, 1979).

8.

Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).

9.

California Water Code Section 102 (Deering 1977).

10.

Cal. Water Code, Section 2501 (Deering 1977); see In re Waters of
Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal.3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr.
350, 599 P.2d 656 (1979).

11.

Anaheim Union Water Company v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978
(1907).

12.

Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 211 P. 11 (1922).

13.

Colorado Power Company v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 218
Cal. 559, 24 P.2d 495 (1933).

14.

Id.; 23 California Administrative Code Section 685(d) provides
that less than thirty days is "regulation," i.e. the temporary
storagepermitted ariparian.

15.

American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts
§

850A.

-45-

16.

Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation
District, 3 Cal.2d. 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935) (ten year limit); see
also Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Company, 200 Cal.
81, 252 P. 607 (1926), cert. dismissed, 275 U.S. 486 (1927)
(limit on water used on uncultivated grazing land declared beyond
the police power of the state).

17.

Statement of Professor Frank Trelease to the Governor's
Commission to Review California Water Rights Law (July 14, 1977);
cf. Trelease, Water Law 11-12 (Third edition, 1979).

18.

Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).

19.

Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).

20.

City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 P.
784 (1921).

21.

City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199, 537
P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).

22.

Schneider, "Groundwater Rights in California" (Governor's
Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, Staff Paper No.
2) 43-49 (1977) (Orange County experience reviewed).

23.

Id. at 19-34 and 50-60.

24.

Niles Sand and Gravel Company v. Alameda County Water District,
37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1974), cert. denied, 419

u.s.
25.

869 (1975).

City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199, 537
P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. l (1975}.

26.

Craig, "Prescriptive Water Rights in California and the Necessity
for a Valid Statutory Appropriation," 42 Cal. L. Rev. 219 (1954);
Kletzing, "Prescriptive Water Rights in California:

-46-

Is

Application a Prerequisite?"
27.

39 Cal. L. Rev. 369 ( 1951).

People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal.3d 301, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr.
30 (1980).

The decision states that defendant's claim of

prescriptive,rights cannot lie "as against the state" when the
state seeks to enjoin a use initiated after 1914.

The question

of prescription good between private parties in such
circumstances is left open by the court.

Id. at note 15.

28.

Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 211 P. 11 (1922).

29.

Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).

30.

City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199, 537
P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).

31.

Cal. Civil Code Section 1007 (Deering 1971).

32.

City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199, 265,
537 P.2d 1250, 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 49 (1975).

33.

California Water Code Section 2500 et seq. (Deering 1977) treats
statutory adjudications.

34.

Anderson, "Statutory Adjudication of Water Rights" (Governor's
Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, Staff
Memorandum Number 5) 1 (1978).

35.

Although statutory adjudications include rights to the (rare)
subterranean stream in a known and definite channel, percolating
groundwater has been included only in the case of the Scott
River.

36.

See California Water Code Section 2500.5 (Deering 1977).

The interviews and reviews were conducted by Barbara Benson of

the Class of 1982, School of Law, University of California at
Davis.
37.

See note 27 supra and accompanying te<t.

-47-

38.

See note 32 supra and accompanying teKt.

39.

City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Company, 290 Cal. 105, 287 P.
475 (1930); City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14
Cal.3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).

40.

Cf. Fely v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 73 (1881) with City of
Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199, 537 P.2d
1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).

41.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

42.

Arizona v. California, 373

43.

United States v. New Mexico, 438

44.

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 229 U.S. 53

u.s.

546 (1963).

u.s.

696 (1978).

(1913).
45.

United States v. Willow River Power Company, 324 U.S. 499 (1945).

46.

Colburg, Inc. v. State of California ex rel. Department of Public
Works, 67 Cal.2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).

47.

People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1971).

48.

Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790
(1971).

For the view that, at least in California, the state

navigational servitude and the public trust doctrine are in fact
one and the same, see Dunning, "The Significance of California's
Public Trust Easement for California's Water Rights Law," 14 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 357, 387 n. 175 (1980).
49.

See generally "The Mono Lake Litigation" in Dunning (ed.), The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management 141
( 1981).

SO.

See note 8 supra and accompanying teKt.

-48-

51.

Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Company, 200 Cal. 81,
252 P. 607 (1926), cert. dismissed, 275 U.S. 486 (1927).

52.

Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation

53.

District, 3 Cal.2d 489, 569-568, 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (1935) •
•
Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 67 Cal.2d 132, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967).

54.

Id. at 140, 382 and 894.

55.

California Conservation Commission, Report 32-33 (1912).
Appropriations of water for power purposes had been made subject
to administrative control shortly before that.

56.

Id. at 21.

The provisions of this act are now codified in the California
Water Code.

57.

California Conservation Commission, Report 31 (1912).

58.

Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Board, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974).

59.

State of California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).

60.

Such questions are the focus of the continuing litigation over
conditions imposed by the State of California on appropriations
by the Bureau of Reclamation for the New Melones Project.

On

April 8, 1981, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California entered a judgment sustaining some of these
conditions and declaring others invalid.

In essence this

judgment permits the federal government to fill the reservoir at
New Melones without regard to state limitations in order to
produce power, but not to deliver water for water supply
purposes.

This judgment is currently on appeal in the Ninth

Circuit (No. 81-4189).

-49-

61.

See generally State of California, The California Water Atlas

47-50 (1978, 1979).
62.

See generally id. at 50-56.

63.

Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law,
Final Report 165-166 (1978).

64.

Id. at 166-168.

65.

California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 118-80
(January 1980).

A map identifying these eleven basins is

reproduced as Appendix B of this paper.

66.

See particularly California Water Code Sections 1255, 1243 and

1243.5 (Deering 1977).
67.

But see the board's assertion of authority in recent regulations
promulgating procedures for protecting instream beneficial use.

23 California Administrative Code

§§

1050-1060 (promulgated May

30, 1981).
68.

See cases cited at note 3 supra and accompanying teKt.

69.

Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law,
Final Report 119 (1978).

Authority to grant interim instream

appropriations, valid until establishment of an instream flow
standard for the stream in question (to be done within five
years), was however recommended by the commission.

Id. at 114-5.

70 •

Id • at 113- 114 •

71.

See notes 59 and 60 supra and accompanying text.

72.

See National I.e ague of Ci t.ies v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

73.

See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.

74.

See "Panel Kills Bill on Water Saving," Los Angeles Times (August

16, 1980) part I, p.3.

-so-

(1976)~

75.

The following discussion is taken from Eugene C. Lee and Harrison

c.

Dunning, "Political Dynamics and Decision-making" in

Competition for California's Water:

Alternative Resolutions (to

be published by the University of California Water Resources
Center).
76.

These statutes are codified at California Water Code Sections
100.5, 109, 1011 (see also 1010), 1210-1212, 1241, 1244,
1345-1348, 1704.1-1704.4, 1725-1730, 1735-1740, 1745, 1825,
1831-1836, 1840, 1845, and 1850-1851 (Deering Supp. 1981).

77.

See note 56 supra and accompanying text.

78.

James W. Johnson, "The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act
and Trends in Western States Groundwater AdMinistration and
Management:

A Minerals Industry Perspective," 26 Rocky Mountain

Mineral Law Institute (1980), pp. 1031-1103; Philip R. Higdon and
Terence W. Thompson, "The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management
Code," 1980 Arizona State Law Journal, pp. 621-671.
79.

The bill in unamended form was approved by more than a two-thirds
vote in each house of the Arizona legislature.

Higdon and

Thompson, id. at p. 621.
80.

See generally Dean E. Mann, The Politics of Water in Arizona
(Tucson:

81.

The University of Arizona Press, 1963).

Farmers Investment Company v. Bettwy, 113 Arizona 520, 558 P.2d
14 (1976).

82.

Valley v. City of Prescott (No. C-28568) and City
of Chandler v. Kyrene Water Company (No. C-397751).
Interestingly, the statute reverses the usual practice by
including a nonseverability clause -- if any part of the statute

-51-

is found unconstitutional by the courts, the entire statute will
fail.

By this device the Arizona legislature "tried to ensure

that the courts will not consider any detriment to any particular
water user without also looking at the corresponding benefits to
that user and the corresponding detriments to other water users."
Johnson, supra note 78 at p. 1063.
83.

Act of April 22., 1981, Ch. 192 § 17 and Ch. 203.

-52-

APPENDIX A
INITIATIVE MEASURE PROPOSED FOR NOVEMBER 1982 BALLOT
DIVISION 8.

WATER RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENCY ACT

PART 1.

GENERAL DECLARATIONS AND POLICY

15000. This division shall be known and may be cited as the
"Water Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act."
15001.

The people of the State of California find and declare as

follows:
(a) The waters of the state are a limited resource subject to
ever increasing demands.
(b) Conservation and the efficient management of water resources
are necessary to meet the competing needs of urban communities, industry,
agriculture, and recreation.
15002. In order to promote balanced development and preservation
of water resources for the benefit of present and future generations of
Californians, the people of the State of California further find and
declare as follows:
(a)

Cost-effective methods of water conservation shall be

promoted.
(b) Water development and use shall conserve water in rivers,
streams and lakes for fishing, recreation, wildlife support, water quality
control, and related purposes.
(c) The Stanislaus River Canyon is an historical, geological,
and natural treasure. At the present time, filling the New Melones
Reservoir to a moderate level is an effective compromise that will provide
for irrigation, flood control, power generation, and water quality
enhancement, while preserving the natural and recreational qualities of
the canyon.
(d) Underground water is a shared resource. Successful
groundwater management programs, such as those of Los Angeles, Orange,
Riverside, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara Counties, and other areas of
the state, should be adapted to those parts of California known to have
critically overdrafted groundwater basins.
PART 2.
15100.

WATER EFFICIENCY AND CONSERVATION

It is the policy of the State of California that:

(a) Conservation and the efficient use of water shall be
vigorously pursued to protect both the people of the state and their water
resources.
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(b) Economic efficiency in water allocation and use requires
that those who receive water from a water project pay their full
proportionate share of the costs of developing and delivering that water;
that subsidies shall be discouraged; that the use of property taxes to pay
for any cost of water development or delivery shall be minimized; and that
property taxes shall be phased out for payment of such costs associated
with developed water supplies.
(c) Efficiency also requires that additional water importation
be considered only where economically competitive water conservation
programs are developed and implemented in the importing area.
15101.

As used in this part:

(a) "Basin" means a hydrologic study area described in
Department of Water Resources Bulletin 160-74; except that, for the
purposes of this part, the Sacramento Basin and the Delta-Central Sierra
Basin shall be deemed a single hydrol?gic basin.
(b) "Interbasin transfer" means the transfer of water for use in
a basin other than the basin in which the source of the water is located.
(c) "Public agency" means (1) any state or federal agency; and
(2) any city, city and county, county, or district organized, existing,
and acting pursuant to the laws of this state.
15102. Every water supplier of, or contractor with the state or
federal government for, more than 20,000 acre-feet of water per year,
engaged in or contracting for the interbasin transfer of water on the
effective date of this division, regardless of the basis of water right,
shall on or before January 1, 1985, prepare and submit to the board a
water conservation program as provided in Section 15104. After the
effective date of this division, no such supplier or contractor shall make
a new or increased interbasin transfer of water, regardless of the basis
of water right, unless and until an adequate water conservation program
has been prepared and is being adequately implemented, as determined by
the Board.
15103. An application to appropriate more than 20,000 acre-feet
of water involving an interbasin transfer of water shall include a water
conservation program as provided in Section 15104. Any permit or license
issued by the board for an appropriation of water to which this section
applies shall contain a condition requiring the continued satisfactory
implementation of the water conservation program.
15104. The water conservation program shall be consistent with
the policies in this division, and shall :i.dendfy a11 reasonable wafer
supply alternatives, including, but not limited to (1) water conservation
and other practices to achieve greater efficiency in water use, (2) waste
water reclamation, (3) improved water management practices, including
groundwater management and conjunctive use of ground and surface waters
consistent with any groundwater management program adopted pursuant to
Part 4 of this division (commencing with Section 15300), (4) any pricing
and rate structure change which would result in water conservation, (5)
banking of water supplies for use in water deficient years, (6) interbasin

-54-

and intrabasin transfers of developed water supplies, and (7) inbasin
conventional water supply development. Any measure which would
substantially impair significant wetlands shall not be deemed a reasonable
water supply alternative. The water conservation program shall include,
but not be limited to, a comparison of costs and a plan for implementation
of alternatives. Where implementation of a water conservation program, or
a portion thereof, will cost less on a marginal-cost basis than
importation of additional supplies, the program, or portion thereof, shall
be implemented prior to commencing additional importation projects.
Implementation of alternatives shall include adoption of all necessary
ordinances or regulations.
15105. Any public agency, water supplier or water contractor
shall have the power to use any existing financing authority to implement
a water conservation program as described in Section 15104.
15106. (a) No provision of this part shall be construed to
endorse, require, or prohibit the construction, maintenance, or use of the
facility authorized by subdivision (a) of Section 11255 (as added by
Chapter 632, Statutes of 1980 (S.B. 200)), if Chapter 632 is effective.
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect any obligation of any
person or entity under the California Environmental Quality Act (Division
13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code).
PART 3.
CHAPTER 1.

INSTREAM PROTECTION
GENERAL PROVISIONS

15200. (a) It is the purpose and intent of this part to
conserve a reasonable amount of water in the streams, rivers, lakes, bays,
estuaries, and wetlands of the state for the benefit of present and future
generations of Californians.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that
instream uses of water be given due consideration in the state's water
rights permit and license system.
15201. Water may be appropriated for reasonable and beneficial
instream uses, including, but not limited to, fishery and water-related
wildlife uses and recreational, aesthetic, scientific, scenic, and water
quality uses in the same manner as water is appropriated for other uses
pursuant to Part 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of Division 2.
15202. The appropriation of water pursuant to this part does not
require thediversi~m arany other form of physical control of the water
appropriated. No change in place of use by an appropriator under Chapter
10 (commencing with Section 1700) of Part 2 of Division 2 shall be allowed
for any appropriation of water for instream use, nor shall the right to
appropriate water for instream uses create in the appropriator any right
to exclude others from any beneficial, reasonable instream use of that
water which is consistent with and does not impair the use for which the
water is appropriated.
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15203. Whenever an applicant for a permit to appropriate water
pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) proposes a project
or proposes the appropriation of water which may have an adverse impact on
instream uses, the board shall allow the appropriation only upon the
condition that the permittee implement measures to offset those impacts.
The board shall reserve jurisdiction with respect to the provisions of any
condition included in a permit or a license subject to this section.
15204. The board may establish instream flow protection
standards to implement this part, provided that no such standards shall
impair vested water rights.
CHAPTER 2.

STANISLAUS RIVER

15225. In order to prevent the waste, unreasonable use, or
unreasonable method of diversion of water, as provided in Section 2 of
Article X of the California Constitution, the impoundment of water behind
New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River, except as required for (1)
satisfaction of vested rights, (2) releases to preserve and enhance fish
and wildlife, (3) releases for water quality control purposes, (4) flood
control purposes, and (5) generation of hydroelectric power only to the
extent that the water is stored and released for one or more of the four
purposes listed above, shall be prohibited until the project operator has
entered into long-term water service contracts for specific municipal,
industrial, or agricultural uses representing at least 75 percent of the
firm yield of the New Melones Project, as determined by the board.
15226. No person, state agency, subdivision of the state,
state-regulated agency, or entity organized under the laws of the State of
California shall enter into any contract for the purpose and delivery of
water from the New Melones Project unless the contract provides for the
payment by the purchaser of the purchaser's proportionate share of both of
the following:
(a) All operation, maintenance, and delivery costs for the New
Melones Project and related conveyance facilities during the term of the
contract; and
(b) The construction costs of the New Melones Project without
subsidy from other facilities or other water users.
15227. For the purposes of Section 15226, "cost," means the cost
as allocated to water supply elements of the New Melones Project when the
Water and Power Resources Service (now the Bureau of Reclamation) of the
United States Department of Interior assumed responsibility for the
proJect !rom fhel.:Jiiitea statesAfmyCorps··ofEngineers on November 20;
1979.
15228. Any person, state agency, subdivision of the state,
state-regulated agency, or entity organized under the laws of the State of
California entering into an agreement for the purchase and delivery of
water from the New Melones Dam Project shall condition its agreement to
provide that the agreement shall not be in full force and effect until
long-term water service contracts are signed representing 75 percent of
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the firm yield of the New Melones Project.
15229. In complying with the terms of this chapter, the board
shall, to the extent possible, restrict storage of water in the New
Melones Reservoir to the area downstream of Parrott's Ferry Bridge, 808
feet above mean sea level.
PART 4.
CHAPTER 1.

GROUNDWATER RESOURCES CONSERVATION
FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF POLICY

15300. The people of the State of California find and declare
all of the following:
(a) Conditions of critical groundwater overdraft currently exist
in several areas of the state, adversely affecting water resources
throughout the entire state.
(b) Local groundwater resources shall be managed to avoid
conditions of long-term overdraft, land subsidence, water quality
degradation, and other significant environmental harm.
(c) Local economies shall be built and sustained on reliable,
long-term water supplies and not upon long-term overdraft as a source of
water supply.
15301. The people, however, recognize that, in certain areas,
long-term overdraft cannot immediately be eliminated without causing
severe economic loss and hardship. In those areas, the groundwater
management programs provided for in this part shall include all reasonable
measures, consistent with the policies and provisions of this division, to
prevent a further increase in the amount of long-term overdraft and to
accomplish continuing reduction in long-term overdraft.
CHAPTER 2.
15310.

As

DEFINITIONS

used in this part:

(a) "Groundwater" means water beneath the surface of the earth
within the zone below the water table in which the soil is completely
saturated with water. Groundwater does not include water subject to the
existing permit and license system administered by the board.
(b) "Local entity" means any city, city and county, or county.
Local entity also means any public utility, mutual water company, or
general or special district or agency, provided it is authorized to
acquire, develop, replenish, or otherwise manage or regulate water
supplies. Any member entity of a district, agency, or authority,
including a joint powers authority, shall also be considered a local
entity for the purposes of this part.
(c) "Long-term overdraft" means the condition of a groundwater
basin in which the average annual amount of water extracted for a period

-57-

of five years or more exceeds the average annual supply of water for that
period to the basin, plus any temporary surplus.
CHAPTER 3.

CRITICAL GROUNDWATER OVERDRAFT AREAS

15320. The following groundwater basins identified in Department
of Water Resources Bulletin 118-80 are hereby declared to be critical
groundwater overdraft areas and shall establish groundwater management
authorities and otherwise comply with the provisions of this part: (a)
Santa Cruz-Pajaro Basin; (b) Cuyama Valley Basin; (c) Ventura County
Basin; (d) Eastern San Joaquin County Basin; (e) Chowchilla Basin; (f)
Madera Basin; (g) Kings Basin; (h) Kaweah Basin; (i) Tulare Lake Basin;
(j) Tule Basin; and (k) Kern County Basin.
CHAPTER 4.

GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES

15330. Within one year after the effective date of this
division, the local entities within a critical groundwater overdraft area
designated in Section 15320 shall identify a responsible authority to
carry out the groundwater management requirements of this part and shall
transmit their nomination to the board. The board shall designate the
authority nominated by the local entities as the groundwater management
authority for the area unless an objection is filed with the board by a
local entity in the area within 60 days after the transmittal of the
nomination to the board.
15331. In making their nomination pursuant to Section 15330, the
local entities in a critical groundwater overdraft area shall nominate one
of the following from their area, as the responsible groundwater
management authority for their area: (a) a local entity which is a public
agency, (b) a joint powers authority organized under Chapter 5 (commencing
with Section 6500) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code, or (c)
a groundwater management district organized pursuant to law, if and when
such a law is enacted.
15332. If, one year after the effective date of this division,
the local entities within a designated critical groundwater overdraft area
have not nominated a responsible authority as provided for in Section
15330 and 15331, or an objection to the nomination has been properly filed
with the board, the board shall, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
expeditiously determine whether any existing public local entity can
effectively serve as the groundwater management authority for the area.
Where the determination is made in the affirmative, the board shall
d~s;i~ll.(it~CiJ?ublic local entity as the groundwater management authority
for the area.
·
15333. If, pursuant to Section 15332, the board determines that
no existing public local entity can effectively serve as the groundwater
management authority, the board shall provide notice of the determination
to all local entities within the area. Upon receipt of the notice, the
local entities within the area shall, within 180 days, create a joint
powers authority for the purposes of meeting the groundwater management
requirements of this part, which authority shall be designated by the
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board.
15334. Any groundwater management authority designated by the
board pursuant to this part may exercise, as appropriate, any of the
powers set forth in (a) the Orange County Water District Act (Chapter 924,
Statutes of 1933 as amended on or before the effective date of this
division), (b) the Sierra Valley Groundwater Basin Act (Chapter 449,
Statutes of 1980), or (c) future legislation authorizing additional powers
for groundwater management authorities. In addition, any such authority
shall have the power to limit, control, or prohibit extraction of
groundwater within the groundwater management area to respond to
conditions of long-term overdraft, subsidence, water quality degradation,
significant environmental harm, well interference, or the threat of any of
those conditions.
CHAPTER 5.

LOCAL GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

15340. Not later than two years after a groundwater management
authority is designated, the authority shall adopt a groundwater
management program for the area.
15341. (a) Each groundwater management program shall include a
detailed statement of groundwater management objectives. These objectives
shall include, but shall not be limited to, all of the following:
(1) Reduction of water demand by means of water conservation,
waste water reclamation, and other means.
(2) Preservation and improvement of water quality by means of
soil and drainage management.
(3)

Effective use of the storage capacity of the groundwater

(4)

Maintenance of groundwater supplies to provide water for

basins.
wetlands.
(b) Groundwater management objectives shall be consistent with
the policies and provisions set forth in this division.
15342. Each groundwater management program shall include a plan
of implementation for achieving the groundwater management objectives
stated. The plan of implementation shall describe the actions necessary
to achieve the groundwater management objectives stated and set a time
schedule for each action to be taken.
15343. Groundwater management programs shall be reviewed
periodically and may be revised. Any revision of a groundwater management
program shall be subject to all the requirements for the adoption of an
initial groundwater management program.
15344. A groundwater management program or a revision of a
program shall not become effective unless and until, after notice and
opportunity for hearing, it is approved by the board.
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15345. The board shall act upon any groundwater management
program or revision within one year after its submission to the board.
15346. The board shall approve a groundwater management program
or revision where it finds that the groundwater management objectives and
implementation plans stated in the program are consistent with the
policies and provisions of this division, and that the implementation plan
will be adequate to achieve the groundwater management objectives stated
in the program.
CHAPTER 6.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

15350. One year after the effective date of this division no
land within any critical groundwater overdraft area shall be irrigated
unless the land has been irrigated for at least one growing season in the
immediately preceding three calendar years.
15351. The restriction in Section 15350 shall remain in force in
any critical groundwater overdraft area until the board has approved the
program pursuant to Section 15346. Upon application, the board may grant
individual exemptions to the requirements of Section 15350 where the board
finds that the development would not result in the net increase of water
use within the critical groundwater overdraft area and would otherwise be
consistent with Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution.
15352. The board shall not approve any application to
appropriate water for an interbasin transfer to any critical groundwater
overdraft basin until the board has approved the management and
implementation programs for the area pursuant to the requirements and
provisions of Section 15346.
CHAPTER 7.

EFFECT ON LOCAL ENTITIES

15360. Nothing in this part shall be construed to preempt or
otherwise interfere with any existing authority of local public entities
to manage, regulate, or otherwise provide for groundwater or the
extraction of groundwater in areas which are not designated as critical
groundwater overdraft areas by Section 15320.
CHAPTER 8.

EXEMPTION FOR SMALL GROUNDWATER FACILITIES

15370. Any well which produces less than 75 gallons of water per
minute shall be exempt from any requirement imposed by this part or as a
result of····the requirements of this··· part.
PART 5.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

15400. Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary,
every affected public entity in California shall, to the fullest extent
possible, implement the policies and the provisions of this division.
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15401. The board· shall adopt regulations and take all
appropriate actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to
enforce the policies and provisions of this division. Any person may
petition the board to enforce the provisions of this division, pursuant to
procedures adopted by the board.
15402. (a) Any person may, within 60 days after final action by
the board, file a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court in
and for the County of Sacramento regarding the validity of any
administrative action of the board in carrying out the provisions and
policies of the division. Failure to file the petition within 60 days
shall preclude Pny person from challenging the board's action in any
administrative or judicial proceeding.
(b) Any person shall have standing to enforce the provisions of
this division in a proceeding for declaratory or injunctive relief.
Except as provided in subdivision (a), nothing in this section shall
limit any other cause of action which may be available under other
provisions of law.
(c) The board may
injunctive relief and other
Court in and for the County
provisions and the policies

request the Attorney General to seek
appropriate judicial remedies in the Superior
of Sacramento when necessary to enforce the
of this division.

15403. This division may be amended or repealed by the
procedures set forth in this section. If any portion of subdivision (a)
is declared invalid, then subdivision (b) shall be the exclusive means of
amending or repealing this division.
(a) This division may be amended to further its purpose by
statute, passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, a
majority of the membership concurring, and signed by the Governor, if at
least 20 days prior to passage in each house the bill in its final form
has been delivered to the board for distribution to the news media and to
every person who has requested the board to send copies of those bills to
him or her.
(b) This division may be amended or repealed by a statute that
becomes effective only when approved by the electors.
15404. The people of the State of California find and declare
that the policies and the provisions of this division are in furtherance
of the policy of conservation and reasonable and beneficial use contained
in Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution and, being
necessary for the health, safety, and welfare of the state and its
inhabitants, shall be liberally construed.
15405. If any provision of this division or the application
thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the division which
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provisions of this division are severable.
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APPENDIX B
BASINS SUBJECT TO CRITICAL CONDITIONS OF OVERDRAFT
1.

SANTA CRUZ· PAJARO BASIN

2.

CUYAMA VALLEY BASIN

3.

VENTURA COUNTY BASIN

4.

EASTERN SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY BASIN

5.

CHOWCHILLA BASIN

6.

MADERA BASIN

7. KINGS BASIN
8.

KAWEAH BASIN

9.

TULARE LAKE BASIN

10. TULE BASIN
11.

KERN COUNTY BASIN

BASINS WITH SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. SURPRISE VALLEY BASIN
B. LONG VALLEY BASIN
C. SIERRA VALLEY BASIN

"

SOURCE:

[

"

s

0

(

Department of Water Resources
Bulletin ·118=80 (January i9BO)

BASINS SUBJECT TO CRITICAL CONDITIONS OF OVERDRAFT
OR WITH SPECIAL PROBLEMS
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